Every few years someone writes a critique of the architectural competition. The complaint is always the same: hundreds of teams, one winner, and a mountain of unpaid drawings. Those accounts are usually accurate about the competitions they describe, and the practices writing them have earned the right to make them. But the story is told from its worst case. Most competitions are not the Guggenheim Helsinki with 1,715 entries, and most practices do not live off competitions at all. It is worth asking first what a competition actually asks of a practice and what it returns. Seen that way, it is a bet whose costs and odds can be estimated, and the question is how to bet well. An economic reading is of course a partial one. It measures what can be counted, and part of what competitions are for cannot be.
A disclosure first. I have been running a practice for more than 35 years. Almost everything we have been commissioned to do came to us through winning invited competitions or direct appointment. One office's record proves nothing by itself, and the profession does not collect such records systematically. That is why I am wary of accounts based only on the experience of winners.
The first surprise is how few practices compete. The Architects' Council of Europe's 2024 sector study, based on roughly 28,000 architects in 29 countries, found that 18% of respondents had entered a design competition in 2023. About 40% of those entries were in open procedures and the rest invited or preselected.1 Cost was the most common reason for staying out. That figure is a share of survey respondents rather than a census of practices. The sample, though large, is unevenly spread across countries, so the number is indicative rather than a European rate. It counts a single year, and so understates how many practices compete at some point over a decade. And for the minority who organise their work around competitions, often the younger and the more ambitious, competitions are close to the whole business rather than a sideline. That is why the same cost question looks existential from one desk and marginal from another. Even that minority mostly enters procedures where the field is limited, so the "everyone loses" picture describes a fraction of a fraction. That puts the cost problem at its true scale.
For the practices that do compete, an entry has a cost that is easy to underestimate and a reward that is easy to overestimate. The cost is not the registration fee and the printing. It is the weeks of reading the brief, testing options, coordinating consultants and producing the submission, including the evenings the principals do not invoice to anyone. The reward is not the announced fee of the winning commission, because most of a fee pays for delivering the services. What is left to recover competition costs is the surplus after delivery, overhead and normal remuneration.
To calculate an entry's expected value, start with any guaranteed payment and any expected prize. Add the commission's surplus, multiplied by both the chance of winning and the chance that a win becomes a real commission. Then subtract the full cost of entering.
Take three cases. Assume that the eventual commission leaves a surplus of €100,000 and that a win has an 80% chance of going ahead. In a large unpaid open competition with 80 entrants and an entry cost of €8,000, the €80,000 expected surplus divided by 80 competitors is €1,000 against €8,000 spent. This corresponds to an expected loss of about €7,000 per entry. In a smaller unpaid competition with ten entrants and the same €8,000 cost, the expected return is zero, a break-even on paper. In a paid final stage with five entrants, an entry cost of €20,000 and a guaranteed payment of €16,000, it is a gain of about €12,000, a reasonable piece of business. These are assumptions for comparison, not European averages. The difference between the first case and the third is not the talent of the entrants. It is the design of the procedure.
Those cases describe one entry, and a practice usually enters a sequence. In the ten-competitor case at an even 10% per entry, the chance of winning nothing over ten entries is about 35%. Put the other way round, that is a 65% chance of at least one win. That rises to roughly 88% over twenty entries. The expected wait for the first win is ten entries. That assumes chances equal and independent, which they are not, so 88% is the result of those assumptions, not a forecast. Kristian Kreiner's research describes outcomes as shaped by how teams read the brief and how juries read the entries, which is reason enough to treat one's own forecast cautiously.2 Nor is winning the same as building. Guggenheim Helsinki was won by Moreau Kusunoki in 2015 and cancelled by the city council in 2016. This exceptional case does not establish a typical cancellation rate. It explains why the calculation keeps the chance of a win becoming a real commission as a separate factor.3
That is still the probability to plan around. A run of ten losses is not a sign of failure: it is the ordinary experience of one practice in three. So the consequence is not "stop entering" but "do not enter unless you can finance ten losses in a row". Expected value and cash in the bank are separate requirements, and it is the second that closes offices. This is a survival rule, not a defence of the arrangement that makes it necessary. Read honestly, it says that the capacity to absorb ten losses decides who may compete. In a profession where roughly seven practices in ten are micro-enterprises, that filter is applied long before any jury sees a drawing. It says nothing either about what a losing run costs in evenings, in staff who watch good work go nowhere, and in the appetite to start the next one. Expected values are calculated calmly. They are not lived that way.
The indirect benefits are the reason most practices give for entering, and they are real. What the evidence does not support is that these turn into commissions by themselves. The 2015 Architectural Record and Van Alen Institute survey covered more than 1,400 designers in 65 countries. Of those respondents, 67% said competitions had not directly produced commissions or paid work. More than 90% attributed no more than 5% of annual revenue to them.4 The survey is old and self-selected, so it cannot describe today's European market, but it is a useful caution. The safer reading is that competitions make an excellent research and marketing budget and a poor revenue budget, and belong in a budget line of their own. A practice that counts them as income cannot tell when it is losing money. One that sets the annual budget in advance, and treats a win as a bonus rather than expected income, is surprised less often.
The lack of evidence deserves attention. No current European survey of competition returns exists. Nothing published today follows an entry from what it cost to produce to what it eventually earned, and the last attempt of any size is the 2015 survey above. What does get measured is the procedure from the client's side: what it costs to run, how the winning scheme compares with the alternatives, how satisfied the commissioning body was. Measurement stops where the interesting question begins, which is what became of the practices that produced those alternatives. The profession argues energetically that competitions are good procurement, and may well be right, but has not put comparable effort into whether they are financially sustainable for practices. That is not a conspiracy: data is expensive, chambers are small, and nobody enjoys counting their own losses. It does mean competitions are being judged largely on figures from the client's side, and that the first useful reform may simply be to start counting.
For some architects competitions are not a bet at all but a steady line of business. Somebody writes the brief, advises the client, checks the submissions and sits on the jury, and those people are mostly architects too. The work is necessary, and the UIA guidance protects it: a jury should be mostly qualified professionals, independent of the entrants, and paid for its time.5 But notice the asymmetry. The jury is paid for judging whatever the outcome. The entrants are paid only if they win. The same expertise earns a fee on one side of the table and requires an unpaid investment on the other. No one designed this to be unfair. A good organiser prevents a vague brief, a careless assessment or an appointment that never happens, and much of that work is itself voluntary or poorly paid. But those who set the terms of a competition risk less than those who accept them. A profession that supplies both the judges and the judged should acknowledge that difference.
It is tempting, then, to see competitions as a transfer from architects to clients, and in a large open field that is roughly what they are. But the client's gain is real and worth naming, because it is the basis for asking clients to pay. The ARCH-E study of 40 competitions put procedural costs at around 0.7% of construction cost. The study models a saving of about 18% compared with the largest scheme submitted in each competition, the client's worst case. Compared with the average floor area of all entries, the modelled reduction is about 3.5% in aggregate, with 26 of the 40 winners beating that benchmark.6 These are modelled comparisons, not measured savings against projects procured without competition, so they are an argument rather than a guarantee. Still, if a competition can plausibly save a client several times what it costs to run, paying the shortlist properly is not charity. It is a modest share of a large gain, spent on keeping good entrants available for the next competition.
None of this requires new law. French public procurement provides that participants who submit compliant work receive a payment based on the estimated price of the studies, reduced by no more than 20%.7 The UIA guide calls for equal remuneration of second-stage participants and honoraria proportionate to the work in invited procedures.5 EU procurement law allows a fixed fee with competition on quality alone, and the follow-on contract to be negotiated with the winner. A competition therefore need not combine free design work with pressure on the fee.8
Put together, a well-designed competition asks for a small, cheap first submission so that an unknown practice can afford to be heard. It selects a short list transparently, pays properly for the shortlisted teams' developed proposals, and commits credibly to appointing the winner. The Helsinki Architecture and Design Museum competition limited first-stage submissions to twelve pages and paid each of five finalists €50,000 to develop their schemes.9 That does not prove every finalist recovered its costs, but it shows that paid final stages are already being used.
For architects, the advice is simple to state and hard to follow. Enter with a budget, not a hope. Prefer procedures with paid stages, small first submissions and a serious client. Estimate the odds by the size of the field, not by the quality of your own idea. Plan for the run of losses that a third of practices will experience, and stop when the budget is spent rather than when the next brief looks irresistible.
Every figure above depends on the cost of entering, and that cost is collapsing. Using AI tools a practice can now generate plausible proposals in a fraction of the time the same output took a year ago, and some entrants already do. This could make competitions more accessible at little cost. If a submission costs a tenth of what it did, the cost filter loosens on its own. The small office that could never finance ten losses can suddenly afford twenty entries. The fall in entry costs could also overwhelm the procedure. Where entry is nearly free, entering everything becomes rational. Fields grow without limit and each entrant's chance of winning falls. The jury is left comparing more proposals in less time. Worse, the submission stops proving what it was meant to prove, which is whether an office can think a building through. When the artefact can be produced without the thinking, that test breaks down, and a jury risks selecting for the image rather than for the capability behind it. The authorship questions arrive at the same moment: whose work is inside the model, and what exactly a client has got when it chooses a winning design.
The changes that AI-powered proposals will bring to the competition landscape cannot be foreseen in detail, and that is itself the argument for adjusting the procedure. It points to two-stage competitions. The first stage should be small enough that a flood of entries costs nobody much. In a paid second stage, a named team has to explain its reasoning in person, with tool use declared and authorship stated. Artificial intelligence makes these changes to the procedure more urgent.
There is one argument this financial assessment does not reach. Architects do not enter only because the expected value is positive. They enter because a school or a library is worth thinking hard about, because architects debate their work in public through competitions, and because the chance to say something about a place has a value that a fee cannot measure. Several of the buildings Europe is proudest of came out of open procedures that a strict financial filter would have prevented. A profession that treated every hour as billable would be worse at the thing it exists to do.
The difficulty is not the vocation but what happens when a procurement system comes to depend on it. A gift that is expected stops being a gift. When unpaid design work becomes the ordinary condition of access, the capacity to make it belongs to those with reserves, other income, or a household that can carry them. The public interest is poorly served by a process that filters for private means before it filters for ideas. Calling the resulting shortfall a contribution to the public good also does something awkward to the conversation. It turns a question about payment terms into a question about how committed one is, and few architects will volunteer to be the person who cares less. The honest position is probably that the vocation is real and worth defending, but depends on a financially viable practice. A profession can afford to give more than it is paid for. It cannot be built on giving more than it is paid for. If society wants exploration before it commits to a building, that is a legitimate thing to want and to commission. Commissioning it rather than assuming it is what keeps the gift a gift.
The competition system is not a machine for grinding architects down. It is a procedure with settings, and most of its problems come from a few of them being left at their worst values: unlimited fields, developed proposals demanded for free, appointments that never arrive. Change the settings and the same procedure produces a fair bet for entrants and a good deal for clients. For the profession, that means pricing the risk of losing into the participation payments and commission fees it negotiates. The evidence supports no confident claim about average returns in either direction. It does support a practical conclusion: architecture can be viable in a market where work is won by competition. The condition is that the procedure lets practices recover the cost of both winning the work and doing it. Several countries already write that into their rules. A client who wants to can adopt it without waiting for anyone. But that means spending money at the stage where budgets are thinnest and the building is still only an idea. That is precisely why it has to be argued for rather than assumed.
Editor
Notes and references
- Architects' Council of Europe, The Architectural Profession in Europe 2024, practice structure and competition participation, pp. 35 and 45–48 (the latest edition of the biennial sector study). ↩
- Kristian Kreiner, Architectural Competitions – Empirical Observations and Strategic Implications for Architectural Firms, Nordic Journal of Architectural Research, 21(2–3), 2009. ↩
- Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, Guggenheim Helsinki, competition and project history. ↩
- Architectural Record and Van Alen Institute, Design Competition Survey, 2015. ↩
- International Union of Architects, UIA Competition Guide, 2020. ↩
- ARCH-E, White Paper: Recommendations for Quality-Based Procurement Processes by Using Architectural Design Competitions, final version, December 2025, chapter 2. The cost comparisons are modelled estimates. ↩
- France, Code de la commande publique, Article R2172-4. ↩
- European Union, Directive 2014/24/EU on Public Procurement, Articles 32(4) and 67, consolidated version of 1 January 2026. ↩
- Architecture and Design Museum, Helsinki, Reimagining Architectural Competitions. ↩
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